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FACTS:

Resp

f father? an

illegitimate child,

under a Wisconsin court order to support his child.

is indigent and cannot comply.
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The child is receiving

Resp decided to get married and applied

Petr refused because Wisconsin
~l\"'--1 -l~e.
.~~~c..z:-~ stato § 245.10(1), (4) and (5) prohibits him to • . ,

~-...a..

to petr for a license.
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without a court order in the case of anyone under an ob-
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ligation to support a child not in his custody.

[The statute
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would also require any court to deny such an order
if the support obligation is not complied with or if
the child is likely to become a public charge.]

Resp

did not apply to a Wisconsin court for a marriage order.
Instead, he brought the instant suit against petr alleging

-----------

----...,

'--=--

-----~~~

that§ 245.10(1) is unconstitutional and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.

He sought a plaintiff's class action

on behalf of all similarly situated fathers whose marriage
license applications had been turned down and a defendant's
class action including all county clerks in Wisconsin.

A

three-judge District Court was empaneled and it declared
~

~

a clas.,.§_ both of plaintiffs and defendants.

It refused to

orde':.., notice to~;;- un::ned class m~r,rs after stating:

~~~

"Some courts have ruled that due process
requires notice to the members of (b)(2)
class if the judgment is to be binding on
them. See, e.g., Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466
F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972); Schrader v.
Selective Service S stern Local Board No. 76
o Wisconsin, 7 F. d
7th Cir. , cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972); Eisen v.~Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2nd
Cir. 1968), on remand, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.
N.Y. 1971); )4 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. N.Y. 1972);
reversed, 479 F.2d 1005 (2nd Cir. 1973);
vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974);
Pasguier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.
La. 1970), aff 1 d 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.
1971). Other courts have held that no notice
need be given to the class members because
due process is satisfied when the class is
adequately represented by counsel. See,~-&·,
Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir.
1972); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st
Cir. 1972); Lund v. Afflect, 388 F. Supp. 137
(D.R.I. 1975T;white v. Local No. 207 of
Laborer's Intl. Union, 387 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.
La. 1974); Mayer v. Weinberger, 385 F. Supp.
1321 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Souza v. Scalone,

.,

,,
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64 F.R.D. 654 (N.D. Calif. 1974);
American Finance System, Inc. v.
Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1972);
Watson v. Branch Cou~th Bank, 380
F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mic . 1974);
Llnch v. Household Finance Cor~.,
3 0 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 197 );
Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F. Supp.
163 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The commentators have been critical of the
line of cases requiring notice to
(b) (2) class members. 3B Moore's
Federal Practice IP 23.55, at
23-1152-23-1153; 7A Wright and
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,§§ 1786, 1793, at 142-144,
203-205; Miller, 'Problems of Giving
Notice in Class Actions.' 1973, 58
F.R.D. 313, 313-316."

The court rejected a request that it abstain under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, noting that there was no pendin_fl
state proceeding.
The court then granted relief to resp's class on
the merits.

It held the Wisconsin statute to violate the

Equal Protection Clause.

It noted that those under suppo~t

~

obligations are treated differently than those not under
. support obligations.

It said that the reasons for the dif-

ferent treatment must be subjected to

strict scrutiny for two
L.....

reasons.

-

"--'

First, marriage is a fundamental right, Roe v. Wade,

supra, at 152; United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra,
at 486, 495; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and the discrimination affects that right; and second because the classification

~1
~j,v~ ·.

- 4 -

"\ ,I"' 'I

resulted in different access to marriage by rich and
\\

poor.

~,r{~y-

Bulloc~ v. Harpe., 405 U.S. 134.
CONTENTIONS:

2.

Petr argues (1) that abstention

should be required under Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.; (2) that
there cannot be class actions without notice; and (3) that
the statute is constitutional.

The state wants to make sure

that resp's money, if and when he gets any, be used first to
support his already existing child and not to support a new
wife and children by her.
DISCUSSION:

3.

to me.

The Huffman argument seems meritless

There is no pending state proceeding.

The class

action point is not very important in this case where due to
§

1253 a binding precedent in this Court will in any event

result.

It will be of more importance in other non-3-Judge

Court cases, however, and I think it should be resolved -especially if the Court is to give plenary consideration to
the merits.
On the merits, this case seems to me to present a
substantive due process issue rather than an e__guaL protec~ion
~ue.

Resp's position is not really made any better by

reason of the fact that there are other people -- those not
under a support obligation -- who can marry without court order.
His claim is simply that the State cannot prohibit him from
marrying just because he has a child which he can't support.
The wealth classification point ~ade by the court below escapes
me.

- 5 It seems to me that the result reached by the
court below is probably correct.

However, this Court

should probably not create new substantive due process
rights by summary affirmance.

I w~uld note the case.

There is a motion to affirm.

2/2/77
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No. 76-879, Zablocki, Milwaukee County Clerk v. Redhail
MEMO TO FILE
This is dictated after reviewing the briefs in the above
case.

It is merely an "aid to memory" rather than an analysis.

Any view expressed or implied is quite tentative.

* * * * *
This is an appeal from a three-judge district court in
Wisconsin that, in a§ 1983 action, invalidated Wisconsin statute
§ 245.10.

That statute requires formal court permission before

certain Wisconsin residents are allowed to marry.

The plaintiff

in this case (appellee here) was the admitted father of an illegitimate child.

He had been ordered to pay $109 per month as

support for the child, but due to his indigency had paid nothing
with an accumulated obligation of some $3,700.
public charge, living on welfare benefits.

His child was a

The defendant (appellant)

was county clerk of Milwaukee County, who denied appellee's application for a marriage license because he had not obtained court authority
under§ 245.10 to marry.

No. 76-879
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That statute applies to persons who have minor issue
in their custody whom they have been ordered to support.

not

It provides

that permission to marry shall be withheld unless the parent submits
proof that he or she has complied with the support order and the
child is not likely to become a public charge.
As there was no way appellee could submit such proof, he
was barred by the statute from marrying -- whether the marriage took
place in Wisconsin or in some other state.

Appellee, therefore, did

not petition the state court for permission to marry, and filed this
action in federal court.
A Rule 23(a) (2) class was certified for_both plaintiff and
defendant.

The defendant class was defined as "all county clerks

of counties within the state of Wisconsin."

There were 72 such

county clerks, whose identity and addresses were known.
notice was given them.

But no

The Attorney General of the state, however,

represented the defendant Zablocki.
Three issues were presented to the three-judge court, wit~ ;
each being decided in favor of appellee.

These issues are now

presented on this appeal:
1.

Abstention.

In view of appellee's failure to exhaust

state remedies (i.e., seek relief in the state courts), it is argued
that under Younger v. Harris and particularly under Huffman v. Pursue,
420 U.S. 592, the federal courts should have abstained.

------------- - - --

view is that abstention was not required here.
ceeding was pending.

My tentative

No state court pro-

See Wooley v. Maynard ("Live Free or Die"),

--~
decided April 20, 1977.

Nor was there any doubt or ambiguity as to

No.

76-879

3.

the requirements of the Wisconsin statute, or as to the inability
of appellee to comply with its terms.

Moreover, this was a civil

matter, and we have not yet extended Younger to a purely civil
action.
2.

Failure to Give Notice.

Appellants argue that under

Eisen (417 U.S. 156), failure to give notice violated Rule 23 and
also denied due process.

My recollection of Eisen is that it applied

to Rule 23(b) (3) action, and did not address the notice requirements
in (b) (2) cases.

Notice should have been given, but the class was

represented by the Attorney General of Wisconsin, and the final order
required that a copy of it be sent to all of the class members.

In

these circumstances, I think the district court was probably right.
3.

Validity of the Statute.

The three-judge court in-

validated the statute on both equal protection and substantive due
process grounds.

The statute established a classification of persons

who were required to obtain prior court authorization of marriage.
The district court, in a somewhat opaque analysis, found marriage
to be a fundamental right under the Constitution, one derived from
the "right of privacy" which -- in turn -- the court seemed to think
was a right of "liberty."

It held that strict scrutiny was required,

but that the Wisconsin statute did not even meet the rational basis
test.
I am inclined, tentatively, to agree with the results.
The right to marry, subject to certain types of state regulations
(e.g., age restrictions), is certainly "fundamental," from whatever

,,

No. 76-879
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source the right may said to be derived.

I view it as a "liberty"

right, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Relevant

cases are abundently cited in appellee's brief.
Although the compelling state interest test may well be
applicabl f ' I think I could probably agree with the district court
that this statute fails to meet the rational basis test.

It is by

no means clear that prohibiting marriage would be likely to cause
a defaulting father to support a child, or that denial of the right
to marriage would prevent him from fathering other children who would
become burdens upon the state.

Moreover, other state statutes

exist (or could exist) far more likely to achieve the desired result
if the state chooses to enforce them.

As noted in the three-judge

court's opinion (jurisdictional statement, Al6) there are several
existing statutes under which obligations to support may be imposed
and enforced.

~ fh,.___~~kr; j ~~
/--0~ u ~ ~ -

2.

law issue here, let alone one which would render unnecessary a
constitutional decision.

The statute is clear on its face and

appellant does not even suggest any material ambiguity
requiring resolution by the state courts.

Appellant's

reliance on Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970) is therefore
misplaced.

In Reetz, the Court vacated a three judge court's

determination of invalidity based on state, as well as
federal, constitutional grounds because the district court
"should have stayed its hand while the parties repaired to the
state courts for a resolution of their state constitutional
2

questions." 397 U.S. at 87.
The unelaborated suggestion that a state court might
find a state law ground for invalidating a statute unambiguous
on its face provides no basis for abstention.

The Court has

repeatedly refused to require abstention simply because
invalidation under the state constitution is a theoretical
possibility.

Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S.

77 (1975); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
597-98 (1976) .
The somewhat distinct, comity-based abstention
doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), is inapplicable because
of the absence of a pending state civil proceeding.

It is

"[t]he pendency of the state court action [which] call[s] for
restraint by the federal court and for dismissal of [the]

.
,

,.

3.

complaint, absent "extraordinary circumstances warranting
federal interference" or inadequate state procedures for
litigating the federal claim.

Trainor v. Hernandez, No.

75-1407 (decided May 3, 1977), slip op. 12.

As in Wooley v.

Maynard, No. 75-1453 (decided April 20, 1977), slip op. 5,
"the suit is no way 'designed to annul the results of a state
trial' since the relief sought is wholly prospective," to
preclude enforcement of §245.10.
That appellee sought to obtain a marriage license
from the county clerk does not give rise to a "pending
proceeding" for Younger-Huffman purposes.

Unlike the

situation in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-397 n. 3 (1975),
appellee did not "first obtain [] an adjudication of [his]
claim on the merits in the [Wis.] state court and only then
commence[] this action" in federal court.

Considerations of

comity and federalism governing federal interference with
state judicial processes which have been set in motion,
Trainor, slip op. 7, are inapposite here.

Appellant is really

asking the Court to transform the Younger doctrine into a
general requirement of exhaustion of state judicial
3

remedies.

Exhaustion may play a limited role in

foreclosing subsequent litigation in federal court of claims
which could have been raised in the ongoing state proceeding,
Judice v. Vail, No. 75-1397 (decided March 22, 1977), slip op.
9, but here no state judicial proceeding preceded the instant
§1983 action.

.
,

,

4.
B.

Notice to Defendant Class In a Rule 23(b) (2) Class
Action 4/
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 &

n.14 (1974), the Court held that Rule 23(c) (2) "requires that
individual notice be sent to all class members who can be
identified 'with reasonable effort.'"

However, the Court was

careful to note that its decision concerned only "the notice
requirements of subdivision (c) (2), which are applicable to
class actions maintained under subdivision (b) (3).

By its

terms subdivision (c) (2) is inapplicable to class actions for
injunctive or declaratory relief maintained under subdivision
(b) (2)."

See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 397 n. 4 ("the

problems associated with a Rule 23(b) (3) class action," see
Eisen, "are not present" in a Rule 23 (b) ( 2) action) .
Relying on Eisen's footnote 14, the three judge court
held that the applicable notice provision is Rule 23(d) (2),
The court noted

and the question becomes one of due process.

that "[a]n ironclad rule requiring individual notice to
members of a (b) (2) class action would frustrate use of (b) (2)
class actions," and would serve no useful purpose as members
of a (b) (2) class cannot "opt out" (Juris. St. App. 8).

The

court held that the discretionary notice provisions of Rule
23(d) (2) are facially consonant with due process.

It reasoned

that due process requires only that "interested parties" be
given notice, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
U.S. 306,

&

Trust Co., 389

5.

314 (1950).

Here, the members of the defendant class were not

interested persons in any realistic sense, for "it is the
state's interest, not that of the county clerks, that is in
reality involved.

The state's interest was protected by the

state attorney general who represented the named defendant and
would also be representing the other members of the defendant
class whether orr not notice was given."
21).

(Juris. St., App.

Furthermore, the three judge court found no "special

circumstances" requiring individual notice in this case.
Dicta contained in J. Medina's ruling for CA2 in
Eisen II, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (1968) spawned a handful of
decisions holding that "notice is required as a matter of due
5

process in all representative actions."

That position is

rapidly becoming the minority view, especially after footnote
6

14.

The leading commentaries argue against a notice
7

requirement for (b) (2) actions.

In their view, due

process considerations are satisfied by the presumed adequacy
of representation, and the virtual identity of claims and
defenses in an otherwise maintainable (b) (2) action.

The

rulemakers saw the (b) (2) action as a vehicle for civil rights
claims "where a party is charged with discriminating
unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are
incapable of specific enumeration."

A requirement of

individual notice in such actions would defeat the purpose of
the rule •

.
\

6.

Furthermore, in many situations a requirement of notice is
senseless, for members of a (b) (2) class have no opportinity
to "opt out."
Mullane, of course, is the sticking point.

The Court

held that publication notice was insufficient to accord an in
personam effect to a state court accounting as to absent,
known common trust fund beneficiaries.

While the language

enjoys J. Jackson's characteristic breadth and persuasiveness,
the Court was really concerned about the adequacy of
representation and of the prospect of prejudice to the
interests of absent beneficiaries.

The Court noted:

[T]hese beneficiaries do have a resident fiduciary as
caretaker of their interests in this property. But
it is their caretaker who in the accounting becomes
their adversary.
Their trustee is released from
giving notice of jeopardy, and no one else is
expected to do so.
339 U.S. at 316.
The (b) ( 2) class act ion presents a very different
;

setting, and here adequacy of representation, on both
plaintiff and defendant sides, may satisfy the command of due
process.

"[T]his Court is justified in saying that there has

been a failure of due process only in those cases where it
cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insure the
protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be
bound by it."

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42, also 43

(1940).
There may be situations where "fundamental fairness"
requires notice in (b) (2) class actions, e.g., where there may

be differences among the members of the plaintiff class with
respect to the details of a structural injunctive decree. The
court's discretion to provide notice under Rule 23(d) (2),
coupled with appellate review for abuse of discretion, should
prevent an unconstitutional application of the Rule. See
Developments-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1391-1453
(1976).

As the court below found, no "special circumstances"

warranting pre-judgment notice were present in this case.

III.

THE MERITS

A.

Equal Protection

1.

"Strict Scrutiny".

The three judge court held

that "strict scrutiny" was appropriate because §245.10 affects
the "fundamental right" to marry and employs a wealth
classification.

See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

If strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of
review, there can be little dispute that the statute is
fatally overbroad with respect to the asserted state interests
of counseling and safeguarding the welfare of indigent
children.

The denial of the right to marry to an indivdual

who has satisfied all support obligations simply because his
issue remains or is likely to become a public charge cannot be
rationally justified on any theory, and appellant does not
even proffer an argument to support this feature of the
statutory scheme.

Appellant asserts that the requirement that

residents meet their support obligations before they take on
the additional responsibilities of a spouse and new issue
furthers legitimate state interests in providing (1) an

'

.

8.

opportunity for mandatory counseling, and (2) an incentive to
satisfy existing support obligations.

The goals are

(

legitimate, but the means employed in§ 245.10 are ~verbroad,
unnecessary, and unsuited to the stated purposes.
Counseling does not take place during the §245.10
hearing, although the experience itself may have a sobering
effect on the willingness to incur further obligations in a
new marriage.

The safeguarding of the interests of the prior

issue can be furthered by more d~
proceedings

"L

ct means: ascontempt

mprisonment or conditional probatio~

attachment, etc.

age _,

~

It can also be argued that even if a legal

marriage is blocked, cohabitation and childbirth out of
wedlock will continue unabated.

tf)f ~

Moreover, marriage may

improve the financial position of an individual, enabling him
to better meet his pre-existing obligations.
Appellant argues that "strict strutiny" is
inappropriate given the Court's recognition in Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975), that domestic relations is "an area
that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province
of the states."

This case involves not "the right to marry in

the abstract," but "the right to marry where the applicant has
minor children to support."

And this is not a statute which

is aimed at the poor per se.

In appellant's view, §245.10

must be viewed as consonant with traditional state marriage
regulations, such as requirements relating to age, blood
tests, competency, solemnization, and fees, and restrictions
relating to incest and bigamy.

A requirement of a "compelling

state purpose" would undermine traditional state regulation of
the marriage regulations.

(Br. 12-16) .

9.

The freedom to marry is a fundamental right implicit
in the Constitution.

See,~-~·, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.

1, 12 (1967); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971);

and the several due process - personal autonomy
9

decisions.

I think the decisions would support

application of a compelling state purpose test to legislation
abridging that right (although this also could be accomplished
by substantive due process analysis). See Maher v. Roe, No.
75-1440

(decided June 20, 1977), slip op. 6-7 (legislation

interfering with a "fundamental right" implicit in due process
of law triggers "strict scrutiny" under the equal protection
clause) •
I do not think Sosna is really to the contrary.

The

Court viewed the durational residency requirement for divorce
as unduly delaying, not "irretrievably foreclos[ing] ," access
to the courts to perfect a divorce.

419 U.S. at 406.

Although it did not articulate a standard of review, the Court
found "the state interest in requiring that those who seek a
divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the state, as
well as a desire to insulate divorce decrees from the
likelihood of collateral attack," sufficiently weighty to
warrant "a different resolution of the constitutional issue
than was the case in Shapiro . .

"

Id., at 409. See

generally The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 47,
91-92 (1975).

The three judge court's recognition of the "wealth

.,.

classification" componen ~

scrutiny" seems debatable.

additional reason for "strict

The strongest case would be an

individual who has met his support obligation but has a child
who is or is likely to become a public charge.

In such a

situation, the statute "operates to the peculiar disadvantage
of [a] class fairly defined as indigent," and "lack of
personal resources [will have] occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit."

San Antonio School Dist.

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22, 23 (1973).

There is some

question in my mind whether appellee who did not meet his
support obligations, has standing to attack this feature of
the statutory scheme.

The aspect of the statute as to which

appellee clearly has standing does not necessarily "operate to
the peculiar disadvantage of [a] class fairly defined as
indigent."
indigent.

Not all support obligation scofflaws are
And it would seem that if a person is truly

i~dig,;:..nt, in most states he can seek a modification of the
prior custody or divorce decree on grounds of "changed
circumstances".
2.
~~
.. ~
,L; ·
,~
~~

..,,,,t-,'

~~-

level of scrutiny, that the statute "must serve

important governmental objectives and must be substantial!~

;..A/0 related to achievement of those objectives."

~

0 &:_ 1.i,
~
~
1

roach is used in this case, I would recommend an

~~- intermediate
1)/"'Y- .

Intermediate Scrutiny. If an equal protection

97 S.Ct. 451, 457 (1976).

.JU«-C-,

~
~-

Craig v. Boren,

This standard has been used in sex~

and illegitimacy cases, i.e., suspect, non-racial
classifications. I see no reason why it cannot be extended to
the "fundamental right" branch of equal protection.

Marriage,

11.

and domestic relations generally, would seem to be an
appropriate area.

Although the right to marry enjoys

constitutional protection, it is a liberty interest which
traditionally has been subject to extensive state regulation.
It is possible to read Sosna as an intermediate scrutiny case,
notwithstanding the state's interference with the "fundamental
right" to dissolve a bad marriage, Boddie v. Connecticut.
The argument can be made that "strict scrutiny" poses
no significant risk of interference with traditional
requirements for a marriage license,~' blood tests,
competency, solemnization, etc. The incest, homosexuality, and
bigamy restrictions would face some difficulties under a
"compelling state purpose" test, although this problem could
be eliminated by defining the "fundamental right" as
coextensive with traditional pairing. Cf. Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Age barriers could be
premised on the presumed lack of capacity of minors. Cf.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629(1968); but see Carey v.
Population Services Int'l, No. 75-443 (decided June 9, 1977).
However, without cataloging every possible state law
requirement in this area, it is fair to say there is a risk

a
./~,L.

that legitimate state concerns might be frustrated under a
"compelling state purpose" regime.

I am not entirely certain

that the marriage context warrants intense judicial
examination of every burden on the right to marry. And I think
it would be an undesirable development to dilute further the

yt'( concept of

'

........... __ ..uz,,,,..,.

s.w:a~

"compelling state interest," as has been done in

the voting rights and ballot access cases, see, e.g., Storer

12.
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Amer. Party of Texas v. White,
415 U.S. 767 (1974), in order to uphold traditional,
legitimate state restrictions in the domestic relations sphere.
An intermediate standard would result in the
invalidation of §145.10.

However, because of focus on the

substantiality, rather than the compelling nature, of the
state's justification and on the means-end fit, application of
this standard is less likely to result in undue interference
with legitimate state regulatory concerns.
3.

"Rational Basis."

is without any rationality.

-----===----~-...,...-=...,...,.

Clearly, a part of the statute

To condition the right to marry

on having previous issue who are not now and not likely to
become public charges, is to punish people for being poor. But
if that is the only basis of invalidity, there is a question
-'/

whether appellee has standing . Even if the Court strikes down
this feature, assuming it is severable from the rest of the
statute, appellee still cannot marry in Wisconsin.

Of course,

this is a class action, but there are no named plaintiffs who
are truly aggrieved by this particular feature of the
10
( scheme.
I am not certain that the support payment requirement
would fail a rational basis test.

The test is a fairly
-------------------lenient one. Wisconsin wants to encourage support payments,
and in furtherance of that goal the state refuses to permit

scofflaws to marry and thus incur new financial obligations.
Undoubtedly, this is a heavy-handed, unnecessary approach. But
"rational basis" scrutiny does not require the state to chose
"the best means to accomplish this purpose."

Massachusetts

~

'

~

13.
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976).
B.

Substantive Due Process

Perhaps a better ground would be substantive due
process.

Appellee suggests that Wisconsin's statute is unique

among the states. A statute which approaches an absolute
denial of the fundamental right to marry intrudes into a
traditional sphere of personal autonomy. "While the outer
limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the
Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual
may make without unjustified government interference are
personal decisions 'relating to marriage, [etc.]'" Carey, slip
op. 5 (emphasis supplied).
The right to marry "may not lightly be denied by
the state."

[W]hen the government intrudes on choices

concerning family living arrangements, the Court must examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the
challenged regulation.

Moore v. East Cleveland, No. 75-6289

(decided May 31, 1977), slip op. 5, 11.
Moore, of course, is a plurality decision. However,
J. Stevens concurred in the judgment for reasons which would
be applicable here. As in Moore, "[t]here appears to be no
precedent" for the Wisconsin statute, and §145.10 "has not
been shown to have any 'substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare'" of the state.
Moore, op. 7-8.

The advantage of the Moore approach is that the
standard of review is rigorous, but not as rigid as
"compelling state purpose" scrutiny, and the occasions for
judicial interference are limited by the teachings of history
and deeply rooted tradition.

Moore, slip op. 8-9.

Of course, Moore is distinguishable.

Aside from the

zoning regulation in that case, the states do not generally
intrude upon family living arrangements.

By contrast,

regulation of marriage is routine, traditional business of the
states. On the other hand, the Court has been willing to
override the exercise of state regulatory power in the
interest of safeguarding the due process right of privacy or
right of personal autonomy.

See, e.g., Carey (invalidating

restrictions on the retail distribution of nonmedical
contraceptives and on the distribution of such to those under
sixteen years of age}.
Some further support for a due process approach can
be found in J. Harlan's decision in Boddie.

In that case, the

Court struck down filing fees for divorce actions as applied
to those unable to pay. The Court held "that a State may not
consistent with the obligations imposed on it by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, preempt the right
to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all
citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so."
Monopolization is present here.

Indeed, Wisconsin's

preemption is even more pervasive, for the state will not
recognize foreign marriages.

Boddie was an "as applied" challenge.

The decision

would support a requirement that Wisconsin permit individuals
in appellee's circumstances to marry if they can demonstrate
"the bona fides of [their] indigency," 401 U.S., at 382.

By

its terms, Boddie does not require invalidation of§ 145.10 as
unconstitutional on its face, unless the Court is willing to
assume that bona fide indigents comprise the overwhelming
number of support obligation scofflaws.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In sum, I recommend affirmance, either because of a
failure to satisfy intermediate equal protection scrutiny or
Moore's substantive due process analysis.

S.E.

ss

FOOTNOTES
1.

Appellee counters that this abstention theory was

not raised in the district court, where appellant's abstention
argument was based solely on the Younger-Huffman doctrine.

In

Hostetler v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964),
the Court declined to require Pullman absention where there
was "no danger a federal decision would work a disruption of
an entire legislative scheme of regulation," and "where
neither party requested it and where the litigation has
already been long delayed . . . . "
2.

Appellant also refers to Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,

319 U.S. 312 (1943), which involved a suit based on diversity
jurisdiction and the due process clause to enjoin a state
railroad commission order permitting the drilling of oil wells
in a certain oil field separated by distances less than the
minimum prescribed for the field in general.

The Court found

that the underlying dispute presented questions of state
policy which were the province of the state administrative
body, and that the due process contention was
indistinguishable from the state law requirement of
reasonableness.
3.

Id., at 332-33.

Unlike the Younger-Huffman cases, appellee is not

seeking to enjoin a state statute pursuant to which he had
been haled into a state proceeding as a defendant.

N-2
4.

There is some question whether this contention

was properly presented below.

The three judge court noted

that although the district court's pretrial order invited
appellant and the Wisconsin attorney general to submit any
written objections to the maintainability of a class action,
appellant failed to make any submission (Juris. St., App. 5).
Appellee noted that counsel for appellant waited six months to
voice their notice contention during the oral argument before
the three judge court on the merits. (Br. 47 n. 24). On the
other hand, the three judge court passed on the class action
issue.
Appellee also argues that the named defendant,
appellant here, has no standing to contest the lack of notice
given to other members of the defendant class. This contention
is not frivolous.

Lack of notice may prevent the operation of

res judicata as to the unnamed members of the defendant class,
but it is not a ground for overturning the three judge court
decision as to appellant. On the other hand, appellant is the
representative of the defendant class and is obligated to
assert the interests of the class as a whole. Appellant might
argue that he had standing to challenge the maintainability of
the class action during the pre-trial period, and to assert
the need for pre-judgment notice below, and his standing
continues in this Court. But see note 10 infra.
5.

See,~-~-, Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111 (CA6

1972); Schrader v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 76

or w1scons1n, 470 F.2d 73 (CA7), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1085
(1972).
6.

Even CA2 has reconsidered its position.

W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (1975).

Ives v.

Accord, Yaffe v. Powers,

454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (CAl 1972); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 508 F.2d 239 (CA3), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975);
Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (CA4 1972); cf. Bijeol
v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 n. 3 (CA7 1975)

(earlier Schrader

ruling will have to be reexamined).
7.

3B Moore's Federal Practice Par. 23.55, at

23-1152 - 23-1153; 7A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, §§ 1786, 1973, at 142-44, 203-05; Miller, Problems
of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 313-16
(1973).
8.

Committee's Notes to Revised Rule 23, 3B Moore's

Federal Practice Par. 23.01 [10.-2), at 23-28.
9.

The Court has yet to hold that "strict scrutiny"

is triggered simply because legislation impacts the "right to
marry," standing alone. The alternative grounds in Loving, for
example, turned on the presence of a racial

classification.

Boddie, which will be discussed below, involved a wealth
classification as well as the right to divorce.
10.

Cf. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969); Bailey v.

Patterson, 396 U.S. 31 (1962). See generally
Developments-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1463-71
(1976).
I am not entirely certain as to how to resolve the

\

standing question. The doctrine of jus tertii may support

.,

appellee's standing to challenge the statute as a whole. See
Craig v. Boren, 97 S.Ct. at 455-56. Moreover, in equal
protection cases, the Court has shown a willingness to
entertain challenges premised in part on overbreadth analysis.
See, e.g., Kramer v. Union School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621
(1969). But cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
I would also note that on the same day the three
judge court decided Zablocki, it dismissed a companion case,
involving a challenge by a father of a public charge who had
V{
made all suport payments. The court noted: "Because

"

plaintiffs in this action fit the above description and are
entitled to relief as members of the plain~iff's class in
Redhail, the individual action is hereby dismissed as moot."
Leipzig v. Pallamolla, 418 F.Supp. 1061(1976); see ACLU amicus
br.
In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976),
the Court refused to dismiss a Title VII action based on
discrimination in hiring and seeking retroactive seniority,
even though the only named representative of the plaintiff
class had been hired by the employer and later properly
;

discharged for cause. The Court noted that "[t]he unnamed
members of the class involved identifiable individuals,
individually named in the record," some of whom had "already
availed themselves of the hiring relief ordered by the
District Court," and that "[n]o questions are raised
concerning the continuing desire of any of these class members

for the seniority relief presently in issue." Id. at 756.
Perhaps, Leipzig, the "identifiable" plaintiff in the
companion case, removes any standing problem presented by the
absence of a perfect fit between appellee's grievance and the
grounds of invalidity asserted.

S.E.

J

;

Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell
From:. Sam Estreicher
Date: September 24, 1977
Re: Zablocki v. Redhail, No. 76 - 879--Supplement to
Bench Memo

In writing the memo for this case, I discussed
middle-tier review without adverting to your concurring
opinion in Craig v. Boren. This was an , oversigh~.
I recognize the problems with "a further subdividing of equal protection analysis," 96 S.Ct. at
464fn, but the Court has fairly consistently declined
to give any substance to the "rational basis"test.

To my

knowledge, there has been only one modern "rational
bas i s"decision

resulting in a holding against the

legislative classification which did not involve a
"fundamental right" or "suspect class."

That was

Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), which, I believe,
was overruled last term (I cannot remember the name of the
case).
Of course, the langua ge in Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), is adequate to the task
in this case.

Wisconsin would be hard pressed to show

that its classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary,
and ... rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly c ircu~stanced
shall be treated alike."
The Royster test was used in Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76 (1971), to strike down an arbitrary gender-

-2-

based classification, but, as you recognized in Craig,
"the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard
of review normally applied takes on a sharper foc u s
when we address a gender-based classification," 97 S.Ct.
at 464fn, even though the Court has yet to hold gender
a

11

suspect class."
By "middle tier review," I meant to suggest that

the rigidities of "compelling state purpose" analysis
might be avoided by applying r ational basis "with a
sharper focus 11 --"with teeth," in Gunther's terms-- to
a classification impinging the "fundamental" decision
whether or not to marry.

S. E.
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RE:

Date:

September 27, 1 977
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/Sam Estreicn~~ , ~
~~LX.I.....) ~
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76-879

Zablocki v. Redliail - Appellees/"Suppl. Memo

~ ~ - 4

App e 11 e es submit a supplemental memorandum
suggest i ng that the Court should postpone argument

~~ ;d-

ct:4'_,.d_,__,;1- ~

becat"~~ he

Wisconsin state assembly has passed a bill which includes a
revision of§ 245.10, the statute in dispute here.

u...,,
~.

Appellees

state that as soon as the assembly decides a procedural motion,
final approval will come and the Governor is expected to sign
the legislation on September 29, 1976.
The major changes from§ 245.10 are:
1.

The bill does not require support-obligated

parents of out-of-wedlock children to get permission to marry.
2.

It does not require proof that the child is not

and is not likely to become a public charge.
3.

It gives the court authority to grant permission

to marry to a person who has not complied with the prior
support order if clear and confincing proof is submitted that
the person is unable to comply.
4.

·.

It establishes a "rebuttable statutory

presumption that a remarriage by any parent who is obligated by
court order or judgment to provide support for any child
.. _ in his or her custody may substantially affect that chi l d's

2.

right of support.

Such presumptionmay be overcome by
II

sufficient contrary proof submitted to the court.

While the proposed legislation may eliminate some of
\

the more problematic features of the Wisconsin statute, the

-

--

instant dispute would not be mooted even if the measure is
:..w,a

,,-,

ultimately signed into law.

-

First, the new§ 245.10 does not

become effective until the procedures under the old statute are
stayed or enjoined by order of any court.

(This is the first

time I have even heard of a statute that remains "in reserve"
until a court enjoins its predecessor.)

Second, the statute

would still require individuals who seek to remarry to show
that they have satisfied prior support obligations or are
unable to comply.

The statute still impinges the right to

marry, but its new form enjoys the appearance of rationality.

S.E.
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Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Sam Estreicher
Date: October 28, 1977
Re: No. 76-879--Zablocki v. Redhail//TM's draft
I have not critiqued the actual language or closely
examined some of the citations because I want to find
out whether we are going to write separately in this
case.
TM uses a standard "fundamental right"/"s t rict scrutiny"
approach, premising the holding on the imprecision of the
means- end fit. Within this framewo rk, the analysis is
proper. My one major problem is the first complete paragraph
on p. 12, where TM draws a distinction, which eludes me,
between "reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with the decision to enter into the mar·tal
relationship," and the statuto ry classification at issue
here which "does interfere directly and substantially with
the right to marry ."

Rules proscribing incest or requiring1

bloo d tests are constitutional because they are justifiable' ) ~ /
not because of the degree of direct interference with

·

the decision whether or not to marry.
In my view, a "strict scrutiny" approach is in tension)

with the network of restrictions that the states have

~ ~

fashioned to govern marriage and divorce.
· some
editorial
suggestions.

The question is whether you wish to write separately,
even
to the effect that/ unde r intermediate level or "rational
basis" scrutiny, the Wisconsin scheme must fall. Tom
Campbell of BRW' s chambers has in_d.icate9 to me that ~RW
may write separately along these lines.
If you do decide to join, I would like an opportunity to
make

,

<!}curl cf tfyt ~ttiuh ~ g
~ag!fin.gfott, J. <!}. 2.llp)!,,;l

.§ltpTtmt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

October 31, 1977

,,..

Re:

No. 76-879

-

Zablocki v. Redhail
r.

Dear Thurgood:
I am glad to join your opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

j1t1l

..

,,,,

Mr. Justice Marshall _
cc:

The Conference

'
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".

~1qrrtmt <.qanrt of t~t Pnittll ~fair.a

1U'a1'1p:ttgfon, ~. <.q. 2Ilp 't.;1
CHAMBERS OF

JUS TI C E WM. J . BRE NNAN, JR.

October 31, 1977

.'

l'

RE: No. 76-879

..
'

Zablocki v. Redhail, etc.

.,

Dear Thurgood:
I agree.

Sincerely,
'

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

.-

,.

,I

.:%>u:vumt (!tcurt cf flrt ~ t h ;%,mttg
JJi:tGqinghm. ~. (!t. 2llffeJ.!,~

j

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

November 3, 1977

Re:

No. 76-879 - Zablocki v. Redhail

Dear Thurgood:
I shall await the dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

I •

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to Conference

§>nµrmtt ~llltrl nf tfy.r i1mtdl .;§tatts

~aslftngtcn, ~-

<4.

20 .;iJ!-'

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 3, 1977

Re: No. 76-879, Zablocki v. Redhail
Dear Thurgood,

.',

I plan to write separately in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Marshall

.

Copies to the Conference
·.,

'
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t ·,.
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<!f!lttrl trf tfrt ~th- .:§t~il
jirctS!rittgfott, ~. <!f. 2.crgr~,

.:§n:prtm.t

CHAMB ERS OF'

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 3, 1977

Re:

No. 76-879 - Zablocki v. Redhail

Dear Thurgood:
I am sorry to have delayed in preparation of my dissent
in this case.
I anticipate it will be around by the end of
next week.
Sincerely,

; r'lt/
\/'

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
Alone among the states, Wisconsin denies a
resident having minor issue not in his custody permission
to marry unless he submitSproof of compliance with
~ n addition,•

outstanding child support obligation;.,.._~

~

I..,_ MC.M,4.,t
/\

~

:

demonstrat ~ that such children "are not then and are not
likely thereaftfr to become public charges." Wis. Stat.
'--....w\.,e·H,, .-r t'1c. """'"t'Yl"',..,I". ,, S•\t'""'"'Jc.dl w,ht,11 ,o,.. w,4r...-o ... t-

~+-h~ s+~f-c.

§§245.10 (1),

(4),

8@l!W!

~

(5)

(1973).

The prohibiton is absoluteJ

recognize common law
,.

marriage license lawfully may be issued in Wisconsin to a
resident who is a noncustodial parent except upon court
order pursuant to the statute.

Any marriage entered into

)

by such a resident, whether solemnized within or without
the state's borders, that does not conform

~--·

requirements of§ 245.10 is declared void

.~,;,.,. ~~arriage

a.cq,i1i5~Rg

licenses in violation of §245.10 are ,

~9~~/1

the judgment of the Court that

~A~

restrictions on t .h e exclusive means1 5 ~ ;tbe r as
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the majority's rationale

sweeps too broadly in an area which traditionally has been
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The Court apparently would subject all state
regulation which "directly and substantially" interferes
with the decision to marry in a traditional family setting
to "critical examination" or "compelling state interest"
analysis.

Presumably, "reasonable regulations that do not

significantly interfere with the decision to enter into the
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed."

"fk
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Since

state regulation in this area typically takes the form of a
prerequisite or barrier to marriage or divorce, f aa~~t
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3.

state legislatures
oversight.
On several occasions, the Court has recognized the
importance of the marriage relationship to the structure of
values essential to organized society.

"This Court has

long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 .

U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).

Our decisions make clear that the

guarantee of personal privacy or autonomy secured against
I

unjustifiable governmental interference by the Due Process

;

Clause "has some extension to activities relating to
marriage, Loving v. Virginia , 399 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) . . .
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).

,,

While the outer

limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by
this Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government
interference are personal decisions relating to marriage.
" Carey v. Population Services International, ___
U.S.

--,No.
JA1 i t b~m t

r?

75-443, decided June 7, 1977, Slip op. 5.
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is a right of marital and familial privacy which places

_j}

substantive limits on the regulatory power of government,

~
~

the Court has yet to hold that the presumption of
constitutionality which attaches generally to legislation
disappears simply because the government seeks to regulate
the conditions of entry into or the dissolution of the
marriage relationship.
The principal authority cited by the majority is
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

Although Loving

speaks of the "freedom to marry" as "one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men," the Court's focus was explicitly on
the miscegnation statute before it.

"

Chief Justice Warren

stated:
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of
man', fundamental to our very existence and
survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942). See also Maynard v. Oklahoma, 125 U.S.
190 (1888). To deny this fundamental freedom on
so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes,
classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all of
the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be
restricted by invidious racial discriminations.
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or
not marry, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State."

!i•, at 12.

Thus, Lovin~ involved a denial of a

"fundamental freedom" on a wholly 4 .upportable ~
I/
the use of classifications directly subversive of the

principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth

is, by
~

5•

Amendment.

II

It does not speak to the level of

judicial scrutiny, or of governmental justification/, for
"supportable" restrictions on the "fundamental freedom"

'r.1nd'1v1'd uals

"

to marry or to dissolve such ties.

The starting point of analysis, in my view, is the

recognition that domestic relations is "an area that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States."

Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 3939, 404 (1975).

As

early as Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878), the
Court noted that a State "has absolute right to prescribe
the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its
own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it
may be dissolved."
The marriage relation traditionally has been
subject to regulation, initially by the ecclesiastical
authorities, and later by the secular state.

The

governmen~ representing the collective expression of the
moral aspirations of a people, has an undeniable interest
in ensuring that its rules of domestic relations reflect
those values.

"Marriage, as creating the most important

relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and
civilization of a people than any other institution, has
always been subject to the control of the legislature.
That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract

.
~

,.

6.

to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute
marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its
effects upon the property rights of both, present and
prospective, and acts which may constitute grounds for its
I

,~

dissolution."

Maynard v. Hil!_, 125 U.S. 109, 205 (1888)

~

~1'w,L,. ,,.t. ~
, A re~:i.Ht@ eef "compelling state purpose" inquiry ii...

"

~~1-~~

i~ ~@Rsi0'fl--wt-eh the network of restrictions that the states
--\

_!_)r--~----~=Typical

have fashioned to govern marriage and divorce.

.f~ ~ rules
,f.~ ~
/;\.l '1V

banning incest, homosexuality and bigamy, fo r

example, do not necessarily rest on any empirical
~

basis but do reflect fundamental, longstanding moral
judgments.

Such judgments may override, in some instances

genuinely held religious beliefs.

So the Court held in

Reynolds v. ~nited States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878):
"Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred
obligation, is nevertheless, in most civilized
nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated
by law. Upon it society may be said to be built,
and out of its fruits spring social relations and
social obligations and duties, with which
government is necessarily required to deal. In
fact, according as monogamous or poly~amous
marriages are allowed, do we find thi principles
on which the government of the people, to a
greater or lesser extent, rests."
The point is presented most clearly in the contex
of traditional restrictions on the freedom of individuals

.

to dissolve the bonds of = ~ ~,; ,mfortMl:'\a~e l:lf'lien •
I am not prepared to say that due process or equal

I

'

7•

protection constitutionalizes the principle of "no-fault
divorce."

, e present trend is favor of making the opbion

of divorce more fr

ly available may reflect s6und public

policy, but I see no wa

ant

for elev'a.ting this

I
development to a constitutio al plane simply because the
r

traditional barriers ~o divorce

re founded on moral,

rather than ubilitarian, empirically demonstrable,
consid~rations, or may be underinclusive or overinclusive
~

h respect to certain professed goals.
II

~J
/,tate power over domestic relations is not without

A
constitutional limits.

The Due Process Clause requires a

showing of justification "when the government intrudes on
choices concerning family living arrangements" in a manner
which is contrary to deeply rooted traditions
City of East Cleveland, Ohio,

U.S.

Moore v.

, No. 75-6289,

decided May 31, 1977, slip. op. 5-6, 8 (plurality opinion
of Powell, J.).

Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster

Families for Equality

&

Reform,

U.S.

76-180, decided June 13, 1977, slip op. 25-30.

, No.

There are

also due process constraints on the extent to which the
state may monopolize the process of ordering essential
human affairs while excluding the truly indigent from that
process.

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.

8.

371 (1971).

Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause

requires generally that the means chosen by the state bear
"a fair and substantial relation" to the object of the
legislation.

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting

Royster Guano Co. v. Vi_rginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920);
Craig v. Boren,

, 97

U.S.

s.ct.

451, 464

(Powell, J., concurring).
The Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass
muster under either the due process or equal protection
standard.

Appellant identifies three objectives which are

,t

supposedly furthered by the statute in question:

~

counseling function;

"""

(1 )

c;.)

a

an incentive to satisfy

-.

"""""'

outstanding support obligations; and (3) a deterrent
against incurring further obligationsa, :preew111a9;!.y

ee

the

opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the asserted
counseling objective bears no relation to this statute.
Slip op. 13-14.

No further discussion is required here.

The so-called "collective device" rationale
presents a somewhat more difficult question.

~s

agree with the suggestion in the opinion

o,j

I do not
~RQ majeEi~y

1.
that a state may never condition the right to marry on
satisfaction of existing support obligations simply because
the state has alternative methods of compelling such

,..

9.

payments.

To the extent this restriction applies to

J,a :,·~

genpin,e s.ce-ff~

who are ~reoen~y able to make the
•
..J\

4,~'*r ~ ,Jo whetherout
r.a4, ..JtJ

required support payments butl\ deeliRe ta f!i9u

!!JO,

~e~~~n~~-~~tgQr

in ~heir

c;i,tody, the Constitution interposes no bar to this

additional collection mechanism.

The vice of the statute

is not in the collection concept, but in the failure to
make provision for the truly indigent who are presently
without the means to comply with child support
obligations.
opinion

~Q~

I ~ d draw support from Justice Harlan's
e-l,,@,---Oe~,t in Boddie v. Connecticut.

I

In that

case, the Court struck down filing fees for divorce actions
as applied to those ~

able to pay, holding "that a
'\

State may not consistent with the obligations imposed on it
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
preempt the right to dissolve this legal relationship
without affording all citizens access to the means it has
prescribed for doing so."

401 U.S., at 383.

The

monopolization present in this case is even more pervasive
than in Boddie, for Wisconsin will not recognize foreign
marriages which fail to conform to the requirements of
§245. 1 0.

3

: ,.

Rider A,

lfp/ss 11/21/77
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10 Zablocki

It is to be remembered that the mar r iage applicant
not only is required by the Wisconsin statute to submit
proof of compliance with his support obligation; in
addition, he must demonstrate - in some unspecified way that his child or children covered by the support order
"are not then and are not likely thereafter to become

.:i,'
public charges~

I would question whether this provision, ;

~~c.~.t
r<",e ~
oo~ld meetAany standard ofA~atioRalit~-

In short, the
1.~ l;f ~ , ....

e tt,tAu,tt-1

state has made no showing of justification for 4tAstatute
that wholly forecloses marriage to many of its citizens
solely because of their indigency.
I concur in the judgment of the Court.

10.

~

The third justification, only obliquely advanced

'

I

by appellant, is that the statute preserves the ability of
marriage applicants to support their prior issue by
preventing them from incurring new 3'l;lf W' obligations.

of §245.10 are so grossly underinclusive with respect to
this objective, given the many ways that additional
financial obligations may be incurred by the applicant
quite apart from those likely to result from the
contemplated marriage, that the classification "does not
bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation."

?)

concurring).

f_raig v. Boren, 97 s.ct. at 464 (Powell, J.,
See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio,

supra, slip op. 5-6 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-50 (1972) (plurality
opinion of Brennan, J.) ..
denial of the rig

;u-··....,,-

satisfied all~ suppor
simply

issue remains or is
can be rationally
The state has

fined the

rt ;~bligation to his p evious issue in
terms of
act with
an acknowledg

in

11.
disability barring the applicant from the
privilege to marry until he is able to alter circumstances

I
which ~F@aQA"l!!lqr may be beyond his control for all practical
purposes.

In such a situation, the statute "operates to

the peculiar disadvantage of [a] class fairly defined as
indigent," and the "lack of personal resources [will have]
occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired
benefit."

San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S •

.. :. lJ)Mf,
1, 22, 23 (1973). ~ Wisconsin has erected what is, in

r:

,-:W.c..~ ' ~

.r.: ~ ,( '4

CA,,~

effect, a} 'means test" forJ-t+tese desiring to enter into the
marriage relationship.

Apparently, no other jurisdiction

~~

has embraced this approach as a mQaR~ of reducing the
of children on public assistance

Put simply, the state

showing of justification for this unprecedented
~

,.,....,_. ...~

exclusion of the bona fide indigent from the exclusive

~~~~:a~

rt,

~-•WA4.~

mea1 Lei ~g~aAa.i.&s@~Pl"Qi the marriage relationship.
"

I\

I concur in the judgment of the Court.

lfp/ss
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Rider A,
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In addition, state regulation has included blood
tests as a precondition to marriage as well as bans on
incest, bigamy and homosexuality.

.,

.
FOOTNOTES
1.

See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74

Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1429-32 (1974).
/

2.

The ban on incestual pairing may be justified

part on health considerations.

Traditional incest

restrictions, however, go beyond any health justification
to encompass moral preconceptions, e.g., states often bar
marriage to a dead brother's wife or matrimony between

-4iQe~nt cousins.

----·-·
3.

Of course, Boddie was an "as applied"

challenge; it does not require invalidation of §245.10 as
unconstitutional on its face.

In ordinary circumstances,

the Court should merely require that Wisconsin permit those
members of the appellee class to marry if they can
demonstrate "the bona fides of [their] indigency," 401
U.S., at 382.

The statute in question, however, does not

contain a severability clause, and the Wisconsin
Legislature has made specific provision for the contingency
that "utilization of the procedures [under §245.10] are
stayed or enjoined by the order of any court."

In the

event of such stay or injunction, Chapter 105, Wisconsin
Laws of 1977, §245.105(3) provides that "permission to
remarry make likewise be granted to any petitioner who
submits clear and convincing proof to the court that for
reasonable cause he or she was not able to

.
J

,

N-2

comply with a previous court obligation for child
support."

Suppl. Memorandum of Appellants and Appellees · a,

11.
4 . , At oral argument counsel for appellant
suggested that the statute merely contemplates an
accounting of prior support obligations as a prerequisite
to a new marriage, and that no license would be denied
where accounts are fully settled simply because a child
remains a public charge.

Tr. of Oral Argument

The

Pallamolla,
plaintiff in the companion case, Leipzig v. - - - - 418
F. Supp. 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1976), however, had complied with
his support obligations but was denied permission to marry
because his four minor children received welfare benefits •

:

~

/tJSpyl,T
A State may not lightly deny the privilege to marry
on grounds of indigency.

Such a condition, while

theoretically not immutable, connotes a practical
inability to alterp one's circumstances for the
foreseeable future. Even where the ability to pay
provides a basis for prediction, say, in screening
the colorable from the frivolous in the administration
of applications for legal relief from marriage or
conviction, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 ( 1'111);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (196 3) ,this Court
has

0

:t:11:i1::t=tl'"

invalidated legislation which "operates to the

peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly defined as
indigent" by working "an absolute deprivation of the
desired benefit" because of a lack of personal resources.
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22, 23

has not simply "fail[ed] to alleviate the consequences
of differences in economic circumstances that exist
wholly apa rt from any state action." Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The statute in this case tells the indigent that whether
or not they have met their prior support olbigations~
they
~r~

1)

r-

_, ,.. C.

I, K

ly

+o

mRR

may not marry tmt!i .r

!fo
A.

,i

on public assistance ,
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Memorandum
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Re Zablocki v. Redhail
Re: 76-879, Zablocki v.
Redhail
I am reasonably
satisfied with this
draft, although it
may be a little longer
you anticipated. I
would like to flag fo r
your attention the last
two:~f~f. This is the
part that gave me the
most difficulty. - ~

/J. p

)h

WHR's draft is persuasive
until he gets to Part II,
when he states that "[e]ven
with ..Eegard to those fathers
who a re absolutely unable
to support their dependent
children, the statute at
least has the effect of
reducimg the likelihood
that they will acquire
additional obligations."
·k

,.,

,'(

Miles Ruthberg, TM's clerk,
called me on Friday to say
that TM's draft is being
revised B~~as to limit its
impact EIN."~the area of
domestic relations. From what
Miles said, I suspect that
there will be little need
-over...

for a separate opinion from
these chambers.
~·(

,'(

,'(

PS is writing a separate
opinion striking down the
Wisc. statute on a due
process theory which is
not very different f ~om
your Moore decision .

~

.

I

;
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 16, 1977

Re:

No. 76-879

Zablocki v. Redhail

Dear Thurgood:
I again apologize for the lateness of my dissent in
this case.
I faithfully promise, subject to the vagaries
of the printers, to have it circulated by Friday, and think
I may be able to get it curculated tomorrow afternoon.
Sincerely,

{;Jt)/

/

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

:

;

QJ,tttd ttf t:Irt~h ~faftg
~as:!ringbm. J. QJ. 2.clffe~.;l

.®uprtntt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVE NS

November 16, 1977

Re:

76-879 -

Zablocki v. Redhail

Dear Thurgood:
My apologies for not responding promptly.
I have
difficulty with some of the broad language on pages
12 and 13 of your circulation and spent some time trying
to draft a possible suggested revision.
Then, when I
learned that Potter was writing separately, I decided to
wait for his circulation. As soon as Potter circulates
his draft, I'll give the case priority attention.

Mr. Justice Marshall

.
;

Copies to the Conference

.,.

,ju:prttttt <4'cttrt of tfyt 'Jjlnittb j,t!ilia'ID1:1olritt9to1t, ~.

<4.

211,SJ~~

CHAMB E RS Of'

November 16, 1977

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: No. 76-879, Zablocki v. Redhail

It has been some three weeks since the proposed
opinion in this case was circulated.
it off dead center?

8/fA .
T. M.

What can I do to get

November 17, 1977

No. 76-879 Zablocki v. Redhail

Dear Thurgood:

I should have advised you sooner that, after. too
much delay, I am writing a concurring opjnion.
My view of the appropriate constitutional analysis
differs rather substantially from yours, although I am with
you on the judgment.

I'll try to be more dutiful next time!
~;.

Sincerely, ,

,:

_t.·

_,

' ii'• t

Mr. Justice Marshall
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CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

November 25, 1977

Re:

No. 76-879 - Zablocki v. Redhail

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to Conference

J

/
Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Sam Estreicher
Date: November 27, 1977
Re: No. 76-879, Zablocki v. Redhail
The attached changes reflect the combined
efforts of Bob (as editor) and me. I hope they are not
too illegible. I have not had the draft reprinted because
I thought you would prefer to examine t he changes in the
context of what previously appeared.
I am somewhat uneasy about our rejection of
the state's third justification( that the statute seeks
to prevent the incurring of new obligations) because we
are employing a heightaned measure of scrutiny without
explicitly saying so.

On pp. 7-8 of the Chambers Draft

(and new insert for p . 7), I have attempted to identify
what is wrong with the statute in terms which do not
require explicit acknowledgment of a middle-tier standard
of review.

I

As I stated in the bench memo, the neatest

way to handle the case would be to use a middle-tier
approach, premised on the state's use of a poverty
classification to block aeeeas to the exercise of the
important privilege to marry, but such a resolution would
seem foreclosed by your concurring opinion in Craig v.
Boren.
PS's analysis is not terribly different from
our own, but his discourse against the use of the Equal
Protection Clause prevents your joining his concurring
opinion; you would be going on record that equal protection
does not apply in the absence of a traditional suspect

:

,.

(2)

·k/

classification~

Although PS asserts a doctrinal preference

for due process, reliance on equal protection gioee eke
permits the states some freedom of action.

For example,

the"population explosi6n''.may develop such proportions that
a state might rationally conclude an across-the-board
limitation on the number of children per family is needed.
(This condition obtains in India.)

PS' substantive due

process rationale may present a greater obstacle - to such
a "solution" than would our poverty classification approach.

·k/ Technically, a "join" could be limited to Part I of

PS' opinion, although this might be read as a concurrence
in the opening ~f as well,.

CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

l

No. 76-879
Thomas E. Zablocki, Milwaukee On Appeal from the United
County Clerk, Etc., Appellant,
States Dis.t rict Court for
v.
the Eastern District of
Roger C. Redhail, Etc.
Wisconsin.
[November-, 19771]
Mn. JusTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
Alone among the States, Wisconsin denies a resident having
minor issue not in his custody permission to marry unless he
submits proof of compliance with outstanding child support
obligations. In addition, he must demonstrate that such
children "are not then and are not likely thereafter to become
public charges." Wis. Stat. §§ 245.10 (1) , (4), (5) (1973).
The prohibition is absolute, whether the marriage is solemnized within or without the State's borders. The State recognizes common-law marriage. And persons obtaining marriage
licenses in violation of § 245.10 are subject to criminal
penalties.
I concur in the judgment of the Court that these restrictions on the exclusive means of living together as husband and
wife cannot withstand applicable constitutional standards. I
write separately because the majority's rationale sweeps too
broadly in an area which traditionally has been subject to
plenary state regulation. In my view, the Court's reliance
on concepts of "fundamental right to marry" and "critical
examination" is neither mandated by the Constitution nor
necessary to invalidate the restrictions in this case.

I
The Court apparently would subject all state regulation
which "directly and substantially" interferes with tlrn decision
to marry in a traditional family setting to "critical examina-

.,.

I.

76-879-CONCUR
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ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL

tion" or "compelling state interest" analysis. Presumably,
"reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with
the decision to enter into the marital relation ship may legitimately be imposed." Slip. op. 12. No doctrinal basis is
offered, however, for distinguishing between classifications
which "interfere directly and substantially with the right to
marry" and other restrictions which do not have this effect.
Since state regulation in this area typically takes the form
of a prerequisite or barrier to marriage or divorce, the degree
of direct interference with the decision to marry or to divorce
will not provide a predictable test for state legislatures or a
principled basis for judiciaJ oversight.
On several occasions, the Court has recogn'ized the importance of the marriage relationship to the structure of values
essential to organized society. ''This Court has Jong recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur. 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974).
Our decisions make clear that the guarantee of personal
privacy or autonomy secured against unjustifiable governmental interference by the Due Process Clause "has some extension to activiti0s relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia,
399 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) .... " Roe v. Till ade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
( 1973). "While the outer limits of th.is aspect of privacy
have not been marked by this Court, it is clear that among
the decisions that an individual may rnal<:e without unjustified
government interference are persona] decisions relating to
marriage . . . . " Carey v. Populatfon Services International,
U. S. - , - , No. 75-443, decided June 7, 1977, slip
op. 5.
Thus, it is fair to say that there is a right of marital and
familial privacy which places substantive limits on the regulatory power of government. 1 But the Court has yet to hold
1

See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy,

74 Colum.

L. Rev.
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that the presumption of constitutionality which attaches generally to legislation disappears simply because the government
seeks to regulate the conditions of entry into or the dissolution of the marriage relationship.
The principal authority cited by the majority is Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ( 1976). Although Loving speaks of the
"freedom to marry" as "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," the
Court's focus ,vas rxplicitly on the miscegenation statute
before it. Chief Justice Warren stated:
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942). Sre also Maynard v. Oklahoma, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). To deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so clirectly subversivr of the principle of equality
at the heart of thr Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive al1 of the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law. The Fourternth Amenclment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution,
the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another
race rrsicles with the individual and cannot be infringed
by the State."
Id., at 12. Thus. Loving involved a denial of a "fundamental
freedom" on a whol1y unsupportable basis, by the use of
classifications "directly subversive of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.... " It does not
speak to the level of judicial scrutiny, or of governmental justification, for "supportable" restrictions on the "fundamental
freedom" of individuals to marry or to dissolve such tics.
The starting point of analysis, in my view, is the recognition that domestic relations is "an area that has long been
regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States."

l\
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Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 3939. 404 (1975). As early as Pen~
noyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 734-735 ( 1878), the Court noted
that a State "has absolute right to prescribe the conditions
upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens
shall be created. and the causes for which it may be dissolved."
The marriage relation traditionally has been subject to
regulation, initially by the ecclesiastical authorities. and later
by the secular state. The Government. representing the collective expression of the moral aspirations of a people, has
an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of domestic
relations reflect those values. "Marriage, as crea.ting the most
important relation in life. as having more to do with the
morals and civilization of a people than any other institution,
has always been subject to the control of the legislature.
That body prescribes the age at ,vhich parties may contract
to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the
property rights of both, present and prospective, and acts
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 109. 205 (1888). In addition. state
regulation has included blood tests as a precondition to marriage as well as bans on incest, bigamy and homosexuality.
A "compelling state purpose" standard or inquiry would cast
doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have
fashioned to govern marriage and divorce. 2
2 Typical rules banning incest , homosC'xnality and bigamy , for example,
do not nccess:1rily rest on :rny empiric:1.l basis but do reflcrt fund:1mental,
longstanding moral judgments. Snrh judgments may overridr, in some
inst:1nce~, genuinely held rrligious brlicfs. So the Court held in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U. S. 145, 165-166 (1878):
"Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless,
in most civilized nntions, :1 civil contract, and usunlly rcguhted by law.
Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social
relations and socinl obligations and duties, with which government is
necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as monognmous or poly-
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II
But state power over domestic relations is not without
constitutional limits. The Due Process Clause requires a
showing of justification "when the government intrudes on
choices concerning family living arrangem('nts" in a manner
which is contrary to deeply rooted traditions. Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, Ohio, U. S. - , No. 75- 6289, decided
May 31, 1977, slip. op. 5-6. 8 (plurality opinion of PowELL,
J.). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
& Reform, U. S. - , - , No. 76-180, decided June 13,
1977, slip op. 25-30. There are also due process constraints
on the extent to which the State may monopolize the process
of ordering essential human affairs while excluding the truly
.indigent from that process. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S.
371 (1971). Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause
requires generally that the means chosen by the State bear
"a fair and substantial relation" to the object of the legislation. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920); Craig v.
Boren, U. S. --, - , 97 S. Ct. 451 , 464 (PowmLL, J.,
concurring).
The Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass muster
under either the due process or equal protection standard.
Appellant identifies three objectives which are supposedly furthered by the statute in question: (i) a counseling function;
(ii) an incentive to satisfy outstanding support obligations;
and (iii) a deterrent against incurring further obligations.
The opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the
gamous marriages are allowed, do we find the prin ciples on which the
government of the people, to a greater or lesser extent, rests."
The point is presented most clearly in the context of traditional restrictions on the freedom of individuals to dissolve the bonds of ma.rtimony. I
am not prepared to say that due process or equal protection constitutionalizes the principle of "no-fault divorce."
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asserted counseling objective bea.rs no relation to this statute.
Slip op. 13- 14. No further discussion is required here.
The so-ca11ed "collective device" rationale presents a somewhat more difficult question. I do not agree with the suggestion in the Court's opinion that a State may never condition
the right to marry on satisfaction of existing support obligations simp]y because the State has alternative methods of
compelling such payments. To the extent this restriction
applies to persons who are able to make the required support
payments but simply wish to shrink out their moral and legal
obligation, the Constitution interposes no bar to this additional collection mechanism. The vice of the statute is not
in the collection concept. but in the fai]ure to make provision
for the truly indigent who are presently without the means
to comply with child-support obliga.tions. I draw support
from Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie v. Cor1r1ecticut. In
that case. the Court struck down filing fee s for divorce actions
as applied to those wholly unable to pay, holding "that a
State may not consistent with th e obligations imposed on it
by the Due Process Clanse of the Fourteenth Amendment,
pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without
affording all citizens a.ccess to the means it has prescribed
for doing so." 401 U.S .. at 383. The monopolization nresent
in this case is even more pervasive than in Boddie, for Wisconsin will not recognize foreign marriages which fail to conform
to the requirements of § 245.10. 3
a Of com'Sr , Boddie wa s an "a s applied" rhallrngr: it dorR not 1w111ire
invalidation of ~ 245.10 ns unrons1i1u1ionnl on iti:; fore . In ordinar~' rircumstanrrs, 1hr Court should mrrrl:v rrq11irr that Wisronsin prrmit those
membrrs of th e apprllrr rl nss to mnrr~, if 1hrv rnn drmorn,tratr "thr bona
fidrs of rtheir] indigrnr:v," 401 U . S., nt 382. Thr stnt11tr in q11rstion ,
howcvrr , dors not rontnin n srvcrnbilit~, rlnusr, nnd thr Wisconsin Lrgislature has madr sprrifir proYision for thr rontingrnrv thnt "u1 ilizntion of
the prorcdnrrs r11ndrr ~ 245.10] nrr stn:vrd or rnjoinrcl by thr ordrr of
any court." In thr evrnt of snrh R1a~, or inj11n r tion . Chantrr 10.5, Wisconsin Laws of 1977, § 245.105 (3) provides that " permission to remarry

'
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The third asserted justification, only obliquely advanced
by appellant, is that the statute preserves the ability of marriage applicants to support their prior issue by preventing
them from incurring new obligations. The challenged provisions of § 245.10 are so grossly underinclusive with respect to
this objective, given the many ways that additional financial
obligations may be incurred by the applicant quite apart from
those likely to result from the contemplated marriage, that the
classification "does not bear a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation." Craig v. Boren , 97 S. Ct., at
464 (POWELL, J., concurring). See Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, supra, slip op. 5-6 (plurality opinion of
PowELL, J.); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 448-450
(1972) (plurality opinion of BRENNAN, J.).
It is to be remembered that the marriage applicant not only
is required by the Wisconsin i::tatute to submit proof of compliance with his support obligation; in addition, he must
demonstrate-in some unspecified way-that his child or children covered by the support order "are not then and are not
likely thereafter to become public charges." 4 I would question whether this provision meets any standard of review.
Apparently, no other jurisdiction has embraced this approach
as a method of reducing the rolls of children on public assistance. In short, the State has made no showing of justificamake likrwise be granted to an:v petitioner who submits clear and convincing proof to the court that for rrasonable cause he or . he was not able to
comply with a previous court obliga1ion for child support ." Suppl.
Memorandum of Apprllants and Apprllees 8, 11.
4 At oral argument coumirl for appellant suggested that the f-tatute
merely contemplatrs an arro1mting of prior support obligations as a prerequisite to a JlC'W marringr, and ihat no lirense would be drnied where
accounts are full~, settled simpbr brrause a child remains a public charge.
Tr. of Oral Arg. - . The plaintiff in the rompanion ca~e, Leipzig v.
Pallamolla, 418 F. Supp. 1073 (ED Wi,;. 1976). however, had complied
with his support obligaiion~ but wa s denied prrmi ·sion to marry because
his four minor children received welfare benefits.
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tion for an unprecedented statute that wholly forecloses marriage to many of its citizens solely because of their indigency,
I concur in the judgment of the Court.
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment of the Court that Wisconsin's
restrictions on the exclusive means of creating the marital
bond. erected by Wis. Stat.~~ 245.10 (1). (4). and (5) (1973),
cannot withstand applicable constitutional standards. l write
separately because the h1ajority's raitionale sweeps too broadly
in an area which traditionally has been subject to plenary state
regulation. The Court apparently would subject all state
regulation which "directly and substantially" interferes with
the decision to marry in a traditional family setting to "critical
examination" or "compelling state interest" analysis. Presumably, "reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with the decision to enter into the marital relationship
may legitimately be imposed.'' Slip. op. 12. The Court does
not present. however. any principled means for distinguishing
between the types of regulations. Since state regulation in
this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier
to marriage or divorce. the degree of "direct" interference with
the decision to marry or to divorce is u11likely to provide either
guidance for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight.

I
On several occasions. the Court has recognized the importance of the marriage relationship to the maintenance of values
essential to organized society. "Th is Court has long recog-

;
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nized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourter~nth Amendment." Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632. 639-640 (1974).
Our decisions make clear that the guarantee of personal
privacy or autonomy secured against unjustifiable governmental interference by the Due Process Clause "has some extension to activities relating to lllarriage. Loving v. Virginia,
399 lT. S. 1, 12 (1967) .... " foe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973). "While th<' outer limits of this aspect of privacy
have not been marked by this Court, it is clear that among
the decisions that an individual may 1nake without unjustified
government interference arc personaJ decisions relating to
marriage . . . . " Carey v. Population Services International,
- U. S. - , - , No. 75-443, decided June 7, 1977, slip
op. 5.
Thus, it is fair to sti,y that there is a right of marita.J and
familial privacy which places some substantive limits on the
regulatory power of government. But the Court has yet to
hold that all regulation touching upon marriage implicates a
"fundamentaJ right" triggering the most exacting judicial
scrutiny. 1
The principal authority cited by the majority is Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ( 1967). Although Loving speaks of the·
"freedom to marry" as "one of the vita.I persona.I rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," the
Court focused on the miscegenation statute before it. Chief
Justice Warren stated:
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man.' fundamental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v.
1 Although the c/ls~s cited in the text, indicnte thnt there is a sphere of
privacy or autonomy smrounding nn existing mnritnl relntionshjp into
which the Stnte mny not lightly intrude, the~· do not necps,;arily 8uggest
that the smne barrier of justification blocks regulation of the conditions of'
ent r~, into or the dis;;olution of the marital bond. See genernlly Henkin,
l'rivu.cy nnd Autonomy, 74 Col,1.1n. L, Rev, 1410, 1429-1432 (1972).

.
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Oklahoma, 316 U. R. 535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Oklahoma, 125 U. S. 190 (1888). To deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the
racial classifications embodied in these statutes. classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive all of the State's citizens of liberty without clue
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution.
the freedom to marry. or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed
by the State." Id., at 12.

Thus. Loving involved a denial of a "fundamental freedom"
on a wholly unsupportable basis-the use of classifications
"directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of
the Fourteenth A.mendmept . . . . " It does not speak to the
level of judicia.1 scrutjnyl of, or governmental justification for.
"supportable" restrictions on the "fundamental freedom" of
individuals to marry or divorce.
In my view. analysis must start from the recognition of
domestic relations as "an area that has long been regarded as
a virtually exclusive province of the States." Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U. S. 393, 404 ( 1975). The nuirriage relation traditionally has been subject to regulation . initially by the ecclesiastical authorities, and later by the secular state. As early as
Pennoyer v. l-·:ejJ, 95 U. S. 714. 734- 735 (1878). this Court
noted that a State "has absolute right to prescribe the coqditions upon which the m~rriage relation between its own citizens shall be created. and the causes for which it may be
dissolved." The State. representing the collective expression
of moral aspirations. has an undeniahle interest in ensuring
that its rules of domestic relations reflect the widely held
values of its people.
"Marriage, 11s creating the most important relation in
life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization
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of a people than any other institutioll. has always been
subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which pa.rties may contract to marry,
the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the
duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the
property rights of both. present and prospective, and acts
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S.190, 205 (1888).
State regulation has included bans on incest, bigamy and
homosexuality. as well as various preconditions to marria.ge,
such as blood tests. 'Likewise, a showing of fault on the part
·of one of the ·partners traditionally has been a f.l'F8QQtHlitior~ to
'the dissolution of an unsuccessful union. A "compelling st~te
·purpose" standard or inquiry would cast doubt on the network
of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern mar. riage and divorce.

II
State power over domestic relations is not without constitutional limits. The· Due Process Clause requires a showing of
· justification "when the government intrudes 011 choices concerning family living arrangements" in a manner which is
contrary to ·deeply rooted traditions. Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U. S. 494, 499. 503-504 (1977) (plurality
opinion of PowELL.-J.). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster
U. S. - . - . No.
Families for Equality & Reform, --76-180. decided June 13. 1977. slip op. 25-30. Due process
constraints also limit the extent to which tpe State may
monopolize the process of ordering certain h uh1an relationships
while excluding the truly indigent from that process. Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). Furthermore. the
Equal Protection Clause requires generally that the means
chosen by the State bear "a fair and substa.ntial relation" to
the object of the legislation. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71. 76
' (H>71), quoting Royst(Jr G·«ano Co, v.. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,.
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415 (1920); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 210-211 (1976)
(POWELL, J. , concurring).
The Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass muster
under either due process or equal protection standards. Appellant identifies three objectives which are supposedly furthered
by the statute in question: (i) a counseling functiori; (ii) an
incentive to satisfy outstanding support obligations; and
(iii) a deterrent against incurring further obligations. The
opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the asserted
counseling objective bears no relation to this sta.tute. Slip op.
13-14. No further discussion is required here.
The so-called "collection device" rationale presents a somewhat more <lifficult question. I do not agree with the suggestion in the Court's opinion that a State may never condition
the right to marry on satisfaction of existing support obligations simply because the State has altemative methods of
compelling such payments. To the extent this restriction
applies to persons who are able to make the required support
payments but simply wish to shirk their moral and legal
obligation. the Constitution interposes no bar to this additional collection mechanism. The vice inheres not in the
collection concept. but in the failure to make provision for
those without the means to comply with child-support obligations. I. draw support from Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie
v. Connecticut. In that case. the Court struck down filing fees
for divorce actions as applied to those wholly unable to pay.
holding "tha.t a State may no~consistent with the obliga.tions
imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal rela.tionship without affording all citizens access to the means it has
prescribed for doing so." 401 U. S.. at 383. The monopolization present in this case is even more pervasive than in Boddie,
for Wisconsin will not recognize foreign marriages which fail
to conform to the requirements of~ 245.10.~
~

Of course, Boddie wa s an "as applied" challenge; it. does not requiro
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The third Justification. only obliquely advanced by appellant. is that the statute preserves the ability of marriage
applicants to support their prior issue by preventing them
from incurring new obligations. The challenged provisions of
§ 245.10 are so grossly underinclusive with respect to this
Qbjective. given the many ways that additional financial obligations may be incurred by the applicant quite apart from lL
contemplated marriage. that the classification "does not bear
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."
Craig v. Boren, 129 U. S .. at 211 (POWELl,, J .. concurring).
Ree Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438. 447-450 (1972) (plurality opinion of BnENNA~. J.); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U. S., at 499-500 (plurality opinion of PowELL,
J.).
The marriage applicant not only is required by the Wisconsin
statute to submit proof of compliance with his support obligation. but also to demonstrate-in some unspecified way-that
his children "are not then and are not likely thereafter to
become public charges."~ This statute does more than simply
"fail to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic
invalidation of § 245.10 a" 1mcorn;t it ut ional on its face. In ordinarr circumstances, the Court "ho11ld merPI~· rrq11ire thnt Wiscon,;in prrmit those
members of the nppellee clns;: to man~· if tlwy cnn drmon,,irate "the bonn
tides of rtheir] indigenc~·." 401 ll . S., nt 382. Thr stntutr in qurstion.
however. doc,; not contnin n 1'Pvcral1ility rln11se. nnd the Wisconsin Lrgislnturc hn,.; made ,;pecifir provision for thr contingency tlrnt " utilization of
the procrdum; r11nder § 245.IOJ Hf(' stn~·ecl or rnjoined b~· the order of
any court." In thr rvent of such stn~· or injunction. Chnpter 105, Wiscorn;in Ln,w of 1977. § 245.105 (3) proviclr;,; that " permi:;sion to remarry
may likewise be grnntrd to any prtit ionrr who submit,, rlear and c01n-incing
proof to the rourt thnt for reni:;01111ble raur,;r he or shr wn~ not ablr to
comply with a previou~ court obligation for child :::upport." Suppl.
1\Trmornndum of Apprllant,.: and Appr-llPes 8. 11.
~ The plaintiff in t11e companion Cfl8C, Leipzig v. Pallarnolla, 418 F. Supp.
1073 (ED Wis. 1976) had complied with hi,; support obligation:,; but wa3
denied permission to marry bccnuse hi~ fo11r minor rhildren received welfare
benefits.
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circumsta.nces that exist wholly apart from any state action. "
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. 34 (1956) (Harlan. J .. .dissenting). It tells the truly indigent. whether they have met their
support obligations or not. that they may not marry so long as
their children are public chargE'!s or there is a danger that their
QAikJren are f>1.1bli0 0Aarg0s Qf t1'0r0 is a Elazng0r tAat t1'0ir·
childrep might go on public assistance in the future. Apparently, no other jurisdiction has embqiced this approach as a
method of reducing the rolls of children on public assistance.
Because the State has not est11blished a justifica.tion for this
unprec~dented foreclosure of marriage to many of its citizens
solely because of their indigency, I poncur in the judgment of
the Court.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment of the Court that Wisconsin's
restrictions on the exclusive means of creating the marital
bond. erected by Wis. Stat.~~ 245.10 (1), (4), and (5) (1973).
cannot .. ithstttnd applicable constitutional standards. I write
separately because the majority's rationale sweeps too broadly
in an area which traditionally has been subject to ph~JHlfY state
regula.tion. The Court apparently would subject all "state
regulation which "directly and substantially" interferes with
the decision to marry in a traditional family setting to "critical
examination" or "compelling state interest" ana.Jysis. Presumably. "reasonable regulations thatJ do not significantly
interfere with the deci,sion to enter into the marital relationship
may legitimately be imposed."A ~lir~. QJ::J. 12. The Court does
not present, however, any principled means for distinguishing
between the"" types of regula.tions. Since state regulation in
this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier
to marriage or divorce. the degree of "direct" interference with
the decision to marry or to divorce is unlikely to provide either
guid~nce for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight.

I
On several occasious. the Court has recognized the importance of the marriage relationship to the maintenance of values
essential to organized society. "This Court has long recog.
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nized that freedom of perso11al choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland
Board of Educati011 v. LaFleur. 414 U. 8. 632. 639-640 (H)74).
Our decisions make clear that the guarantee of persona]
privacy or autonomy secured against unjustifiable governmental interference by the Due Process Clause "has some extension to activities relating to rnarriage, Loving v. Virgi-ll'ia,
399 U. R. 1. 12 (1967) .... " Roe y. lFade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973). "While tlw outer limits of this aspect of privacy
have not been marked by the Court. it is clear that among
the decisio1;s that a11 individual may make without u11justifiecl
government interference are personal decisions 'relating to
marriage ... .'" Carey v. Population Services International,
U. S. - , - , No. 75-443, decided June 7, 1977, slip
op. 5.
Thus, it is fair to say that there is a right of marital and
familial privacy which p1aces some substantive limits on the
regulatory power of government. But the Court has yet to
hold that all regulation touchi11g upon marriage implicates a
"fundamental -right" triggering the most exacting judicial
scrutiny. 1
The principal authority cited by the majority is Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Although Loving speaks of the
"freedom to marry" as "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orc!erly pursuit of happiness by free men." the
Court focused on the miscegenation statute before it. Chief
Justice Warren stated:
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man .' fundamental to our very existence and survival. Ski1mer v.
1 Although the ca~e:,; eited in thr trxt indiea tr that t hrrr iR a sphrrr of'
privacy or nntonomy surrounding an rxi"ting marital rclation:;hip into·
whirh the StHlr mn~· not light!~· intrudr, the~· do not nere~.,:arily "uggest
that. the ,;ame barrier of ju,-tifiration bloek~ regulation of the condition,.; of
entry into or the dissolution of the marital bond. See genrrnlly Hrnkin,.
l)rivaq· and_ Autonomy, ~4 Colutn. L. Hev .. 1410, 1429-14:{2 (1974) ,.
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Oklahoma, 316 F. 8. 535. 541 ( H>42). See also May~
nard v. Oklahoma, 125 U. 8. 190 (1888). To deny this
fundamental freedom 011 so unsupportable a basis as the
racial classifications embodied in these statutes. classifications so directly· subversivf' of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment. is surely to
deprive all of the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedo111 of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution,
the freedom to marry. or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed
by the State." Id., at 12.
Thus, Loving involved a denial of a "fundamental freedom"
on a wholly unsupportable basis-the use of classifications
"directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . " It does not speak to the
level of judicia.J scrutiny of, or governmental justification for.
"supportable" restrictions on the "fundipnental freedom" of
individuals to T)1arry or divorce.
In my view. analysis must start from the recognition of
domestic relations as "an area that has long been regarded as
a virtually exclusive province of the States." Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U. S. 393, 404 (1975). The p1arriage relation traditionally has been subject to regulation. initially by the ecclesiastical authorities. anp later by the secular state. As early as
Permoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 734-735 ( 1877). this Court
noted that a State 'fhas absolute right to prescribe the conditiops upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be crea~d. and the causes for which it may be
dissolved." The Stp.te, representing the collective expression
of moral aspir&tions, has an undeniable interest in ensuring
that· its rules of domestic relations reflect the widely held
values of its people.
"Marriage, as creating the most important relation in
life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization

'.
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of a people than any other institution. has always been
subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract to ma.rry,
the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the
duties and obligations it creates. its effects upon the
property rights of both. present and prospective, and acts
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190. 205 (1888).
State regulation has included bans on incest. bigamy, and
homosexuality, as well as various preconditions to marriage,
such as blood tests. Likewise, a showing of fault on the part
of one of the partners traditionally has been a prerequisite to
the dissolution of an unsuccessful union. A "compelling state
· pµrpose" standard or inquiry would cast doubt on the network
of restrictions that the Stfttes have fashioned to govern marri1tge and divorce.

II
State power over domestic relations is not without constitutiona.J limits. The Due Process Clause requires a showing of
justification "when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements" in a manner which is
contrary to deeply rooted traditions. Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 4~1 F. S. 494, 499, 503-504 (1977) ( plurality
opinion of POWELL, J.). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster
U. S. - . - . Nos.
Families for Equality & R eform , 76-180. et al.. decided June 13. 1977. slip op. 25- 30. Due
process constraints also limit the extent to which the State
may monopolize the process of ordering certain h uma11 relatiooships while excluding the truly indigent from that process.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). Furthermore ,
under the Equal Protection Clause the means chosen by the
State in this case must bear "a fair and substantial relation '' to
the object of the legislation. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76
0971), quoting Roys.fer G1,1,a110 Co, v, Virginia , 253 U. S. 412.

;
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76-879-CONCUJt.
ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL

5

415 (1920); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 210-211 ( 1976)
(POWELL. J., concurring).
The Wisconsin n:ieasure in this case does not pass muster
under either due process or equal protection standards. Appellapt identifies three objectives which are supposedly furthered
by the statute in question: (i) a counseling function; (ii) an
incentive to satisfy outstanding support obligations; and
(iii) a deterrent against incurring further obligations. The
opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the asserted
counseling objective bears no relation to this statute. Slip op.
13-14. No further discussion is required here.
The so-called "collection device" rationale presents a somewhat more difficult questio1:i. I do not agree with the suggestion in the Court's opinion thl'lt a State may never condition
the right to marry on satisfaction of existing support obligations simply because the State has alternative methods of
co1npelling such payments. To the extent this restriction
applies to persons who are 11,ble to make the required support
payments but simply wish to 'shirk their moral and legal
obligation. the Constitution interposes np bar to this additional collection mechanism. The vice inheres not in the
collection concept, but in the failure to make provision for
those without the means to comply with child-support obligations. I draw support from Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie
v. Connecticut. In that case, the Court struck down filing fees
for divorce actions as applied to those wholly unable to pay.
holding "that a State may not, consistent with the obligations
imposed on it by tqe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Arµendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal rela.tionship without affording all citizens access to the means it has
prescribed for doing so." 401 U. S., at 383. The monopolization present in this case is even more pervasive than in Boddie,
for Wisconsin will not recognize foreign marriages that fail
'to conform to the requirements of § 245.10/
:i

Of course, Boddie wm; an "as applied" challenge; it, does not require

·''

·.

,.' '
~
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The third justificatio11. only obliquely advanced by appellant, is that tlw statute preserves the ability of marriage
applicants to support their prior issue by preventing them
from incurring new obligations. The challenged provisions of
§ 245.10 are so grossly un<lerinclusive with respect to this
objective. given the many ways that additional financial obligations may be incurred by the applicant quite apart from a
contemplated marriage. that the classification "does not bear
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."
Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S .. at 211 (POWELL, J .. concurring).
·see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 l.J. S. 438. 447-450 (1972) (plurality opinion of BRENNAN. J.); cf. Moore v. City of East Clevela.nd, Ohio, 431 e. S .. at 499-500 (plurality opinion of POWELL,

J.).
The marriage applicant not only is required by the Wisconsin
statute to submit proof of compliance with his support obligation. but also to demonstrate-in some unspecified way-that
his children "are not then and are not likely thereafter to
become public charges.'':, This statute does more than simply
"fail to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic
i11validatio11 of § 2~.5.10 :l:- u11ro11,.;!itu1io11al 011 it,- fiwr. fo onlu1ary c·ireum:-tnnc•ei,;, thr Court ,-houkl nwrrl~· rrquirP that Wi:,;ro11,-i11 Jl('t'l11it tho,.;p ,
member,- of tlw appelkr rJa,.;,. to · man~· if t lw~· r:111 demo11:,:t r:d!' "the bo11a
fidr$ of rt1wir] i11digrnr~·." ~01 l'.
:It :3S2. Thr :,tatut!' ill qur,-tion ..
hqwr,·('r. doe,- 1101 1·011t:1i11 a ,-r,·c•r:ihilit.,· f'lau,-r. :111d tlw Wi,-eo11,.;i11 Lrgi,.;latun' ha,.; mndr ,-pc•C'ific· prm·i:,:io11 for t lH' c•o111 inµ;rnc·~· that "111 iliz:\t ion of
thr prorrdmr,.; I 1111drr § '.!~5.10 11w~· br! ,.;ta~·<'CI or r11joi11!'d h~· thr orclrr
of :111~· rourt." f11 tlH' ('Hilt ol' ,.;1H'h :1 :,:tay or i11j11nction aftl'r Frbru:u·~· 1,
19ii\. Ch:1ptrr 105. Wi,.;ron"in Law, of 1977. § :HS.105 (:{) proYiclr,.; that
" pc'rmi:,;,.;ion to rrm:1 n~· Illa~· likc•\\'i,.;r hr gm nt!'d to :111~· 1wt it ionrr \\'ho
s11hmit,.; rll':\I' a11d c·on,·i1H'ing proof to ilw c·o11rt that for rra.,011:iblr ra11,.;r ·
hr or "hi' wa,.; 11ot able to c·ompl~· with n prrYiou:- romt obligatio11 for rhild
~11pport ." Suppl. ,1P111or:111d11m of Apprll:int,- and Apprllrr,.; 10. 11.
~ Thr plni11tiff i11 the eomp:111io11 en,.;!', Leipzig,·. Pallm110/la. 418 F. S11pp . .
1073 (ED Wi:,;. 197li) hnd romplird with hi:,: ,.;11pport obligatio11,. but wa!'t
drnird pcrmi,.;sion to marry bernu,.;c hi" four minor:_rllildren rrrri,·rd welfare"

s..

·benefit~.,

;
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circumstances that exist wholly apart from any state action."
Griffin v. lllino'is, 351 F. S. 12. 34 (1956) (Harlan. J .. dissenting). It tells the truly indigent. whether they have met their
support oblig&tions or not. that they may not marry so Jong as
their children are public charges pr there is a danger that their
children might go on public assistance in the future:' Apparently. no other jurisdiction has embraced this approach as a
method of reducing the~ of child rep on public assistance.
Because the State has not established a justification for this
unprecedented foreclosure of marriage to many of its citizens
solely because of their i11digency, I concur in the judgment of
the Court.
I

'.

.'

'

.
J

Quite a.pnrf from n11y impart 011 the f rnl~· indige11t. the 8tatutc appeirns
to "ro11fer IIJ)Oll rt11C j11dgr] II lirPII"'(' !'or arbitra.r~· prurrdm(•," Krnt ,·.
United States, :~8~ r. S. 5-H. 55;~ (HlfiU), in t.he dctrrmi11ation whrthf'I' an
npplie1111t'~ rhildrrn arc '·likcl~· thel'(•nfter to bt•romP public clwrgr"." A
Reriou:,; que:;f ion of proerdma I dur proee"'" i:; ra i~NI b~· t hi~ fen turr of
:atnndnrdle;;::. di;;errtion, partirularly in light of the haiard~ of prediction
in this area.
4

,,.

.§up-u~ Qj:anrl of tltt ~ttiu~ ~f:a.ttg

~ctlll:pttgfon.
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4/ ~ ~Ji.ehnquist suggests that no meaningful line

can be drawn between a statute that imposes a severe legal

i{ ::}-

1

disability on the basis of indigency and a social welfare
measure that fails to reach the entire universe of need for

:f
public assistance in the proces~'of allocating limited
public welfare funds among a myriad of potential recipients."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). See post,
at 2-3.

The recognition of xiE such a distinction, however,

informs many of our decisions upholding the use of
prophylactic, necessarily imprecise, rules of el i.gibil ity
in public assistance and social insurance programs. As
we stated in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776 (1975),
"[c]ommercial insurance policies have traditionally relied

: "

upon fixed, prophylactic rules to protect against abuses
which could expand liability beyond the risks which are
within the general concept of its coverage ..•• When the
Government chooses to follow this tradition in its own social
insurance programs, it doe s Hnot come up against a constitutional
stone wall." This view was recently reaffirmed in Califano v.
Jobst, No. 76-860, decided No vember 8, 1977, slip op. 6:
"General rules are essential if a fund of this

-2magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency,
even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbit nary
consequences in some individual cases. Weinberger v. Salfi,
422

u.s.

749, 776."

Governmental reluctance to finance particular
activity protected against affixmxxi~e official interference
by the Constitution is simply not the equivalent of a
legal barrier, based on indigency, to the exercise of that
activity.
Jobst

The contrasting approaches taken in Boddie and

reflect this point.

Perhaps a more dramatic

illustration can be found in Maher v. Roe, 97 S.Ct. 2376,
2382-83 (1977), where we held that a legi s l ative determination
to reimburse the medical costs of childbirth while declining
to provide coverage for expenses relating to nonthereapeutic
abor Lions did not offend the Equal Protection Clause. Althongh
indigent women might find it extraordinarily difficult,
if not impossible, to exercise the "fundamental right"
recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the

~

state ha,'imposed no restriction on access to abortions

that was not already there."

The Co- rt in Maher noted:

"Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct
state interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity

.

•

consonant with legislative po ll<\;iy. Constitutional concerns
are greatest when the State

A +t~"'1 i)

t.$

."

to impose its will

by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions
deemed to be in the public interest is
necessarily far . - broader."

t11=:1::a:. . . .~
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 76-879 .
Thomas E. Zablocki, Milwaukee On Appeal from the United
County Clerk, Etc., Appellant,
States District Court for
v.
the Eastern District of
Roger C. Redhail, Etc.
Wisconsin.
[November - , 1977]
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment of the Court that Wisconsin's
restrictions on the exclusive means of creating the marital
bond. erected by Wis. Stat.~~ 245.10 (1), (4), and (5) (1973),
cannot meet applicable constitutional standards. I write separately because the majority's rationale sweeps too broadly in
an area which traditionally has been subject to pervasive state
regulation. The Court apparently would subject all state
regulation which "directly and substa.11tially" interferes with
the decision to marry in a traditional family setting to "critical
examination" or "compelling state interest" analysis. Presumably. "reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with the decision to enter into the marital relationship
may legitimately be imposed." Ante, at 12. The Court does
not present. however. any principled means for distinguishing
between the two types of regulations. Since state regulation in
this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier
to marria.ge or divorce. the degree of "direct" interfere11ce with
the decision to marry or to divorce is unlikely to provide either
guidance for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight.

I
On several occasions. the Court has ~sgni1'8'.k,the importance of the marriage relationship to the maintenance of values
essential to Ol'ga11ized society. "This Court has long recog-

~~e/p--1,'
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nized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland
Board of Educatio11 v. LaFleur. 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974).
Our decisions mt.Jee BJef!'rA that the guarantee of personal ~~
privacy or autonomy secured against unjustifiable governmental interference by the Due Process Clause "has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia,
399 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) .... " Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
( 1973). "While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy
have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among
the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified
government interference are personal decisions 'relating to
marriage .... ' " Carey v. Population Services International,
U. S. - , - , No. 75-443, decided June 7, 1977, slip
op. 5.
Thus, it is fair to say that there is a right of marital and
familial privacy which places some substantive limits on the
regulatory power of government. But the Court has yet to
hold that all regulation touching upon marriage implicates a
"fundamental right" triggering the most exacting judicial
scrutiny. 1
The principal authority cited by the majority is Loving v.
Virginw, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Although Loving speaks of the
"freedom to marry" as "one of. the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," the
Court focused on the miscegenation statute before it. Chief
Justice Warren stated :
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v.
1 Although the cases cited in the text indicate that there is a sphere of
privacy . or autonomy surrounding an existing marital relationship into
which the State may not lightly intrude, they do not n<>cessarily suggest
that the same barrier of justification blocks regulation of the conditions of
entry into or the dissolution of the marital bond. See generally Hen)<in,.
1
Privacy and. Autonomy, 74 Colum. L .. Rev. 1410, 142!)-1432 (1974) •

:
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Oklahoma, 316 U. R. 535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. OA-lahoma, 125 U. S. 190 (1888). To deny this

fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive all of the Rtate's citizens of liberty without due
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution,
the freedom to marry. or not marry, a person of another
race resiclcs with the individual and cannot be infringed
by the State." Id., at 12.
Thus. Loving involved a denial of a "fundamental freedom"
on a wholly unsupportable basis-the use of classifications
"directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . " It does not speak to the
level of judicial scrutiny of. or governmental justification for.
"supportable" restrictions on the "fundamental freedom" of
individuals to marry or divorce.
In my view, analysis must start from the recognition of
domestic relations as "an area that has long been regarded as
a virtually exclusive province of the States." Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U. S. 393, 404 (1975). The marriage relation traditionally has been subject to regulation, initially by the ecclesiastical authorities. and lat<>r by the secular state. As early as
Pen1wyer v. Neff, 95 U. R. 714. 734-735 (1877). this Court
noted that a State "has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created. and the causes for which it may be
dissolved." The State. representing the collective expression
of moral aspirations, has an undeniable interest in ensuring
that its rules of domestic relations reflect the widely held
values of its people.
"Marriage, as creating the most important relation in
life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization

..'.
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of a people than any other institution , has .always been
subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract to ma.rry.
the procedure or form essential to constitute ma.rriage, the
duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the
property rights of both. present a.nd prospective, and acts
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,205 (1888).

State regulation has included bans on incest. bigamy, and
homosexuality, as well as various preconditions to marriage,
such as blood tests. Likewise, a showing of fault on the part
of one of the partners traditionally has been a prerequisite to
the dissolution of an unsuccessful union. A "compelling state
purpose" inquiry would cast doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage and
divorce.

II
State power over domestic relations is not without constitutional limits. The Due Process Clause requires a showing of
justification "when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements" in a ma,nner which is
,contrary to deeply rooted traditions. Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U. S. 494, 499, 503- 504 ( 1977) (plurality
opinion of PowELL, J.). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, U. S. - , - , Nos.
76-180, et al., decided June 13, 1977. slip op. 25- 30. Due
process constraints also limit the extent to which the State
may monopolize the process of ordering certain human relationships while excluding the truly indigent from that process.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 ( 1971). Furthermore,
under the Equa1 Protection Clause the means chosen by the
State in this case must bear "a fair and substantial relation" to
the object of the legislation. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 , 76
,(1971) , ql,!9.ting
IJ,oy$._ter
QU.,ano CQ . _ v.. Virginia,
253 U. S. 41~...
....
......
...
.
'•

'
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415 (1920); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 21~211 (1976)
(POWELL, J., concurring).
The Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass muster
under either due process or equal protection standards. Appellant identifies three objectives which are supposedly furthered
by the statute in question: (i) a counseling function; (ii) an
incentive to satisfy outsta.nding support obliga.tions; and
(iii) a deterrent against incurring further obligations. The
opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the asserted
counseling objective bears no relation to this statute. Ante, at
13-14. No further discussion is required here.
The so-called "collection device" rationale presents a somewhat more difficult question. I do not agree with the suggestion in the Court's opinion that a State may never condition
the right to marry on satisfaction of existing support obligations simply because the State has alternative methods of
compelling such payments. To the extent this restriction
applies to persons who are able to make the required support
payments but simply wish to shirk their moral a.nd legal
obligation. the Constitution interposes no bar to this additional collection mechanism. The vice inheres not in the
collection concept, but in the failure to make provision for
those without the means to comply with child-support obligations. I draw support from Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie
v. Connecticut. In that case. the Court struck down filing fees
for divorce actions as applied to those wholly unable to pay.
holding "that a State may not, consistent with the obligations
imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has
prescribed for doing so." 401 U. S .. at 383. The monopolization present in this case is even more pervasive than in Boddie,
for Wisconsin will not recognize foreign marriages that fail
to conform to the requirements of§ 245.10.~
:t:,Qt e_e:;;rc , 8o<l;die wns

1-11:1

"as apl,)liccl" chnllenge; it does not requil!'e'

·.

:
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The third justification. only obliquely advanced by appellant. is tha.t the statute preserves the ability of marriage
applicants to support their prior issue by preventing them
from incurring new obligations. The challenged provisions of
§ 245.10 a.re so grossly underinclusive with respect to this
objective. given the many ways that additional financial obligations may be incurred by the applicant quite apart from a
contemplated marriage. that the classification "does not bear
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."
invalidation of § 245.10 HS unronstitutionHI on its face. In ordinary circumstHnces, thr Court should merrl~· rrquirr that Wisconsin permit those
members of the appellre rlH~s to marry if the~· cnn demonstrate " the bona
fides of ftheir] indigrncy," 401 U. S., at 382. The stHtute in que;;tion,
howe\•er, dors not rontain H srvernbilit~· rlHuse, Hnd the Wisconsin Lrgislature has made specifir provision for thr contingency that " utilization of
the procedures f11ndcr § 245.10 mHy be] stayrd or enjoined by the order
of Hny court." In the rvent of such H stay or injunction Hfter February 1,
1978, Chapter 105. Wiscon~in Law~ of 1977. § 245.105 (3) providrs that
"permission to rrmarry ma~· likrwise be granted to :my petitioner who
submits clenr and ronvincing proof to the rourt that for rrasonable cause
he or she wns not Hblr to romply with a prrvious court obligation for child
support." Suppl. Memorandum of Appellants Hnd Appellers 10. 11.
The dii;senting opinion of Mn . .TusTICE REHNQUT8'1' sugger,;ts that appellee
mH~' no longer be " incHpable of discharging thr nrrrarage HS required by
the support order Hnd contributing sufficient funds in thr future to rrmove
his child from thr wrlforr rolls." Post, at 4. There is no basis in the
record for such :spernlntion. The purtie,.: enterrd into a stip11lation that as
of August 1974. a month brforr appellee was denird a mnrriage licrnse,
nppeller "wa,.: unrmployed and indigent nnd unablr to pa~· an~· sum for
~upport of his issue." Apprndix, at 21. In it:; opinion datrd August 31,
1976. thr District Court notrd tlwt "[i]n Uedhail';.; CHS<', brcause of his
poverty hr hns bren 11nHblr to ~Htisfy the support obligation ordered in the
paternity artion, and, hencr, a stntr rourt could not grant him permis;:;ion
to mnrr~r." Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1070 (ED Wi,:. 1976).
Appellant hus not challrngrd tl1r factual predicatr of the triHI court's
<lrtermination, or r\·rn intimatrd that apprllrr',: financial situation haS'
'improved matrrially . Such matter~, of cour:-;e, mn.y br inquirrd into by
the local court pursuant to the new l?rocedurrs that will go into effect_
;ifter February 1, 1978..
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Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S., at 211 (POWELL, J., concurring).
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447-450 (1972) (plurality opinion of BRENNAN. J.); cf. Moore v. City of East Clevela.nd, Ohio, 431 U, S., at 499-500 (plurality opinion of PowELL,

J.).
The marriage applicant not only is required by the Wisconsin
statute to submit proof of compliance with his support obligation, but also to demonstrate-in some unspecified way-that
his children "are not then and are not likely thereafter to
become public charges."~ This statute does more than simply
"fail to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic
circumsta.nces that exist wholly apart from any state action."
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. 34 (1956) (Harlan, J .. dissenting). It tells the truly indigent. whether they have met their
support obligations or not. that they ma.y not marry so long as
their children are public charges or there is a danger that their
children might go on public assistance in the future. 4 Apparently, no other jurisdiction has embraced this approach as a
method of reducing the number of children on public assistance. Because the State has not established a justification for
this unprecedented foreclosure of marriage to many of its
citizens solely because of their indigency, I concur in the
judgment of the Court.

3 The pla.intiff in the companion case, Leipzig v. Pallamolla, 418 F. Supp.
1073 (ED Wis. 1976).1\.lrnd complied with his suppor1 obligations but, was

denied permission to mnrry bccau~e his four minor children received welfare
benefits.
1
Quite n.par1 from nny impnct on the 1ruly indigent, the stntute appears·
to "confer upon !"the judge] n license for :ubitmry procedure," Kent v.
United States. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966), int.he determination whether flJl
applicnnt's children nre "like!~· thereafter 1o become public chnrges." A
serious ques1ion of proredurnl due process is raised by this feature of
standardless discretion,. par.t.icular.ly in light oJ the· lrnzarc6 of prcdictiolll
in this area,
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.§u:pnm:t (!Jcm-t cf tqt J!foitt~ .§tatts

~asqinghm. J. (!J.
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 5, 1978

·near Thurgood:
Re:

76-879

Zablocki v. Redhail

I do not see that John's concurring opinion-which I like and agree with--is in conflict with your
opinion. Your first full paragraph on page 12 seems
to me to put you and John on the same wave length.
If John could see his way clear to join your
opinion, I would also join him.
Absent that I now join you.
/ Regards,
I
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Mr. Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference
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